Hello!

Yes, I can confirm that, especially with the new RFC 9774 standard, see https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9774#section-4.
That something we address in the second patch.

Originally, the segfault was handled by returning ASPA_INVALID on AS_PATH that contained an AS\_SET, but we discovered that this was not the real problem, but rather a bad allocation due to an incorrect calculation of the AS path length. We mitigated this issue with our first patch.

Best, 
--
Evann & Alarig

On 8/31/25 8:02 PM, Alexander Zubkov via Bird-users wrote:
Hi,

AFAIK, ASPA RFC forbid AS sets and considers such announces invalid:

https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification-22.html#section-6.2-3.3.1

> If the AS_PATH has an AS_SET, then the procedure halts with the outcome "Invalid".

Regards,
Alexander

On Sun, Aug 31, 2025, 18:11 Alarig Le Lay via Bird-users <bird-users@network.cz> wrote:
Hello,

We (Evann and I) found a bug related to as_path_getlen() when used by
aspa_check(). When a route contains an AS_SET segment type, the length
returned by as_path_getlen() is incorrect. The function assumes that the
length of an AS_PATH_SET is a single AS (1), while in reality an
AS_PATH_SET is an unordered set of ASN (as described here
https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4271#section-9.2.2.1).

See the following update:
        2025-08-31 15:35:15.134 <INFO> Checking prefix 76.165.0.0/16 (path 208627 29075 174 32440 {2055 10349 22985 23207 23294 23366 26002 26303 26333 30564 54529 396992 401290}) IN from bgp_alarig_ipv4

Using gdb we can inspect the path object:
        (gdb) p path->length
        $101 = 72
        (gdb) x /72xb path->data
        0x555555725e54:    0x02    0x04    0x00    0x03    0x2e    0xf3    0x00    0x00
        0x555555725e5c:    0x71    0x93    0x00    0x00    0x00    0xae    0x00    0x00
        0x555555725e64:    0x7e    0xb8    0x01    0x0d    0x00    0x00    0x08    0x07
        0x555555725e6c:    0x00    0x00    0x28    0x6d    0x00    0x00    0x59    0xc9
        0x555555725e74:    0x00    0x00    0x5a    0xa7    0x00    0x00    0x5a    0xfe
        0x555555725e7c:    0x00    0x00    0x5b    0x46    0x00    0x00    0x65    0x92
        0x555555725e84:    0x00    0x00    0x66    0xbf    0x00    0x00    0x66    0xdd
        0x555555725e8c:    0x00    0x00    0x77    0x64    0x00    0x00    0xd5    0x01
        0x555555725e94:    0x00    0x06    0x0e    0xc0    0x00    0x06    0x1f    0x8a

In this example, we have a route with an AS_PATH that contain:
    - an AS_PATH_SEQUENCE (0x02) with a length of 4 (0x04): (208627
      29075 174 32440);
    - an AS_PATH_SET (0x01) with a length of 13 (0x0d): {2055 10349
      22985 23207 23294 23366 26002 26303 26333 30564 54529 396992
      401290}.
The total length of this update is then 17, but if we dump the function
result, we can see that the actual computed length is 5 (4 + 1 for the
AS_PATH_SET).
        (gdb) p len
        $103 = 5

This leads to a too small memory allocation, when normalizing the AS
Path in aspa_check():
        /* Normalize the AS Path: drop stuffings */
        u32 *asns = alloca(sizeof(u32) * len);
Causing a SEGFAULT during the as path walk. Since as_path_walk()
considers each element of the AS_PATH_SET as a step. In the while
(as_path_walk(path, &ppos, &asns[nsz])), the asns object should have a
size of 17 and not 5 resulting in overwriting memory and finally
triggering a SEGFAULT. (However we've seen this working when the AS_SET
is small, for example, it's working for the following route, but this is
mostly luck and could lead to weird behaviors):
        Checking prefix 104.141.0.0/16 (path 208627 29075 174 32440 {400943}) IN from bgp_alarig_ipv4

Here is the gdb output showing this behaviour:
        2025-08-31 15:35:15.134 <TRACE> bgp_alarig_ipv4: Got UPDATE
        2025-08-31 15:35:15.134 <INFO> Checking prefix 76.165.0.0/16 (path 208627 29075 174 32440 {2055 10349 22985 23207 23294 23366 26002 26303 26333 30564 54529 396992 401290}) IN from bgp_alarig_ipv4

        Thread 1 "bird" received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
        0x00005555555d68ac in as_path_walk (path=0x5555000066dd, pos=0x7fffffffd15c,
            val=0x7fffffffd144) at nest/a-path.c:702
        702     const u8 *q = p + path->length;
        (gdb) p path->data
        $1 = 0x5555000066e1 <error: Cannot access memory at address 0x5555000066e1>

And here is a dump of asns just before the segfault :
        (gdb) p *asns@nsz+1
        $57 = {208627, 29075, 174, 32440, 2055, 10349, 22985, 23207, 23294, 23366, 26002, 26303,
          26333}

We propose to set the AS_PATH_SET length to the announced length in the
AS_PATH data instead of 1, see
0001-NEST-correct-as_path-len-calculation.patch.

Furthermore, as per
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9774#name-updates-to-the-requirements
(BGP speakers MUST use the "treat-as-withdraw" error handling behavior
per [RFC7606] upon reception of BGP UPDATE messages containing AS_SETs
or AS_CONFED_SETs in the AS_PATH or AS4_PATH [RFC6793]) and even if
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification-22#name-as_path-verification
changes it to a SHOULD, another improvement we propose is to check for
AS_PATH_SET the same way it’s already done for AS_PATH_CONFED_SEQUENCE
and AS_PATH_CONFED_SET at the beginning of the aspa_check() (see
0002-NEST-return-ASPA_INVALID-for-path-containing-AS_SET.patch). The
proposed patch is only for ASPA, not for ROV, in order to avoid dropping
routes for too much people, and the patch only drop a few amounts of
routes (including a few routes dropped for invalid ROV) :
    Routes:         1031692 imported, 212 filtered, 0 exported, 1031692 preferred

Don’t hesitate to discuss the patch if needed,
--
Alarig and Evann